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Several recent criticisms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) identify multiple 
ambiguities in the way it has been formulated by its chief proponents. Here we 
provide evidence that this hypothesis has also been interpreted in various different 
ways by the scientific community. Our diagnosis of this problem is that SMH lacks 
an adequate computational-level account of practical decision making. Such an 
account is necessary for drawing meaningful links between neurological- and 
psychological-level data. The paper concludes by providing a simple, five-step model 
of practical decision making. Recasting SMH in terms of this model generates more 
precise and empirically tractable computational-level hypotheses about the various 
ways that somatic markers might influence practical decisions.    
 
Introduction 
The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is a popular neuropsychological theory about the 
role of emotions in practical decision making. It has been highlighted as among the few 
successful examples of a “cross-level link” between psychological and neurological levels of 
description (Sun, Coward, & Zenzen, 2005, p. 627). According to this suggestion, SMH offers 
a promising example of how human decision making might be explained in computational 
and neurophysiological terms. However, several recent criticisms charge SMH with 
vagueness and ambiguity (Colombetti, 2008; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). Indeed, 
one recent review identifies no fewer than 38 alternative interpretations of this hypothesis 
(Linquist & Bartol, 2013). This discrepancy is perplexing. On the one hand, SMH is among the 
most influential theses to have emerged from cognitive neuroscience in recent decades, 
having informed innumerable discussions about the role of emotion in practical reasoning. 
On the other hand, it is unclear which functional roles somatic markers play in decision 
making (Ohira, 2010) and the hypothesis is difficult to state in precise terms that allow for 
experimental investigation (Dunn et al., 2006).  
One possible defense of SMH is that, in practice, there is less ambiguity than might appear 
in theory. Previous critics identify several possible interpretations of SMH suggested over the 
course of its 25-year development. But perhaps, in practice, researchers converge on a 
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particular interpretation. Previous criticisms overlook this possibility, because they focus on 
SMH as it is formulated by its chief proponents and not on the ways that it is interpreted by the 
scientific community. We begin by testing this hypothesis with a random sample of recent 
literature citing SMH. Our findings suggest that interpretations of SMH are indeed highly 
variable. These findings underscore the need to understand and rectify the ambiguity 
problem.  
We recast the ambiguity problem as a deficiency at the computational level – i.e. the 
intervening level between psychological descriptions and neurophysiological data. Focus on 
SMH has been on linking practical decision making deficits (e.g. poor financial decisions) to 
neurophysiological damage in the ventromedial frontal cortices, amygdalae, and other 
regions. A computational description ought to facilitate connection among these levels by 
specifying mechanisms underlying the deficit. The current computational account associated 
with SMH identifies a simple association/reactivation mechanism: somatic markers are linked 
to certain representations and then recalled during decision making. Psychological-level 
deficits are characterized as breakdown in this mechanism. The problem, we argue, is that the 
computational account does not explicate the psychological description because it fails to 
distinguish between different stages at which decision making might break down. This 
explains why SMH is so broadly construed. Adding a more detailed, multi-stage 
computational account of decision making allows one to generate and test more refined 
versions of SMH. Finally, our analysis provides a general lesson on the role of  computational 
descriptions in bridging psychological and neurological accounts of cognition.  
Core Themes in Somatic Marker Research 
Given the multiplicity of competing interpretations of the somatic marker hypothesis a 
concise definition is perhaps impossible. However there are a core set of themes surrounding 
somatic marker research. These are briefly outlined in this section as a general orientation to 
the literature.  
Most SMH researchers view emotions in the James-Lange tradition as representations of 
embodied changes in the autonomic nervous system. Somatic markers are brain states that 
“tag” or index such changes. At the same time these tags become associated with the 
representations, of objects or events in the world, that trigger them. Through such 
associations certain representations acquire emotional salience. After a childhood tussle with 
a porcupine, say, future thoughts of quilled quadrupeds might trigger an emotional response. 
An important corollary of this view is that somatic markers are sometimes reactivated without 
attendant physiological changes (Damasio, 1994). In this respect somatic markers serve both 
as triggers and as proxies for full blown emotional responses.  
Another common theme in somatic marker research is that markers themselves are either 
positively or negatively valenced. Hence, the reactivation of a marker provides information 
about whether the associated object or event was experienced as “good” or “bad” on previous 
occasions. This information is thought (somehow) to enhance decision making.  
Particular brain regions are implicated in the establishment and recollection of somatic 
markers. Ventromedial frontal cortices (VMF), amygdalae, and insular cortices are 
considered crucial in the formation and reactivation of somatic markers. Patients with VMF 
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damage in particular have influenced the development of SMH, as they exhibit both flattened 
affect and abnormal decision making abilities. Neurological details of SMH are outlined in 
more detail in Section 4.3.  
The standard experimental probe behind SMH is the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) 
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). IGT is a card selection task in which 
participants must learn, over a series of selections, which of four decks is the most rewarding. 
Each selection earns a monetary reward or punishment. Decks are rigged so that those which 
are initially advantageous become deleterious, and vice versa, mid way through the game. 
Bechara and colleagues (1996) report that an autonomic (skin conductance) response predicts 
the switch to more rewarding decks. This finding is interpreted as evidence for a link between 
bodily feedback and decision making. This general hypothesis has been the subject of 
additional electrophysiological studies (Oya, Adolphs, Kawasaki, Bechara, & Damasio, 2005) 
as well as studies of patients with VMF and amygdala damage (S. W. Anderson, Bechara, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999). The precise nature of 
this link, however, is a matter of ongoing controversy (Dunn et al., 2006; Gerrans, 2007; Maia 
& McClelland, 2004). 
As the discussion so far might reveal, SMH leaves open considerable room for 
interpretation. Most ambiguities arise in the attempt to explain in detail how somatic marker 
reactivation enhances decision making. We now turn to a survey of some competing views on 
this issue.  
How do Researchers Interpret SMH? 
How many alternate versions of the somatic marker hypothesis are there? Philosopher 
Giovanna Colombetti (2008) identifies two versions. “SMH-general” simply posits a role for 
emotions in decision making, while “SMH-specific” proposes that lesions to the VMF impair 
one’s ability to form long term plans, or, “myopia for the future” (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, 
& Damasio, 1996). More recently, Linquist and Bartol (2013) have extended this analysis, 
identifying three independent axes along which versions of SMH equivocate. First, alternate 
versions differ in modality. That is, they disagree about whether somatic markers are 
necessary for decision making or merely contribute to this process. Second, alternate versions 
assign distinct processing roles to somatic markers. Sometimes markers are said to enhance 
the speed of decision making, while at other times they are thought to increase accuracy. 
Often they are said to do both. Finally, Linquist and Bartol identify multiple stages at which 
somatic markers potentially influence decision making. These can be broadly characterized 
into ‘peripheral’ and ‘core’ [Table 1]. The two peripheral stages occur at the initiation and 
termination of a decision process. Decision-point recognition is the initiation phase where an 
individual recognizes that a practical decision is called for. Execution is the termination stage 
where the subject follows through on a decision. Core stages can be divided into at least three: 
option generation involves the identification of alternative courses of action; deliberation 
involves inferring potential consequences from specific options; evaluation involves ranking 
or assigning value to each option. Linquist and Bartol (2013) demonstrate that the chief 
proponents of SMH have posited, at one time or another, a role for somatic markers in all five 
stages. However, equivocation among these alternatives is not explicit.  
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Given the variety of possible interpretations of SMH, an important empirical question 
concerns the way it is understood by working scientists. We selected five target presentations 
of SMH as the basis for our literature search.i These canonical presentations were published 
between 1991 and 2004 – the main period over which SMH was developed. They also 
represent a variety of publication venues: a bestselling book, articles in Science, Phil. Trans. 
Royal B, and Brain & Cognition, and a chapter in an edited volume. An article was included in 
our sample if it referenced at least one of the five target presentations before September 2011. 
To further refine our search, articles were drawn from specific journals. Using the ‘cited 
reference search’ tool from Web of Science, we compiled lists of records citing the target 
articles, broken down by journal.  We sought journals that appeared nearest the top across 
citation reports for all five target articles. Neuropsychologia appeared at or near the top most 
frequently; J Neuroscience also appeared with high fidelity. Both journals were included in our 
sample. Neuroimage and Brain & Cognition also appeared at or near the top frequently, but 
were excluded. The former was excluded because of its highly specialist nature. The latter was 
excluded because early articles are not PDF-searchable, a pre-requisite for our coding 
methodology. Outside of neuroscience and the behavioural sciences, much of the discussion 
of SMH has come from philosophers publishing in philosophical and multidisciplinary 
humanities journals. This category accounted for the next largest source of citations to our 
target articles. Hence we included in our sample articles from Philosophical Psychology and J. 
Consciousness Studies, the two most prevalent sources of this type. Excluding duplicates and 
cases where SMH proponents (A. Damasio, H. Damasio, or A. Bechara) cited their own work 
left a representative pool of 103 articles by 337 authors.   
A coding tool allowed us to identify alternative interpretations of SMH. For each instance 
in which one of the five canonical SMH articles was cited, the following information was 
recorded. 
1. Does the author explicitly identify (a) a role for somatic markers in decision 
making, (b) a role for certain brain regions in decision making, (c) a role for somatic 
markers/ brain regions in determining performance on the Iowa Gambling Task  
(IGT), or (d) none of the above?  
2. Does the author interpret SMH as a specific thesis about myopia for the future?  
3. Does the author take somatic markers/ intact brain regions to be (a) necessary for, 
(b) involved in, or (c) play an unspecified role in decision making?  
4. Does the author take somatic markers/intact brain regions to contribute to (a) 
speed, (b) accuracy, (c) both, or (d) an unspecified role in decision making? 
5. Does the author specify the stage of decision making at which Somatic markers 
become engaged?   
If there was an affirmative answer to the final question, we attempted to determine the stage at 
which somatic markers were being invoked, either as central/peripheral or according to the 
specific stage as outlined by Linquist and Bartol (2013) [Table 1]. Two people applied the 
coding scheme. To ensure uniformity, a series of practice rounds were undertaken on 
separate samples of articles similar to the ones that were coded. Coding of the SMH sample 
occurred after the third practice round, when concurrence among coders reached >95%. 
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The first question functioned as a 
filter. Of the initial 103 articles, 59 
were classified further, having 
invoked some version of SMH. More 
than half of these (n=34) explicitly 
identified a role for somatic markers 
in decision making. Another 19 
citations proposed a role for certain 
brain regions in decision making, 
while only 6 articles identified a role 
for brain regions/somatic markers in 
IGT performance. The 44 excluded 
articles invoked some other aspect of 
the author’s work (e.g. experimental 
protocols).  
Regarding the second question, 
nearly 24% of the citations to SMH 
interpreted it in accordance with 
Colombetti's (2008) SMH-specific. 
These authors took the SMH to 
imply that damage to brain regions 
involved in generating somatic 
markers results in myopia for the 
future. 
Modal interpretations of the 
SMH also varied. Though 30% were 
unspecified, 56% held that somatic 
markers contributed to (some 
component of) decisions, while 12% 
interpreted them as necessary for 
decision making.  
With regard to the fourth question about the contributions of somatic markers/ brain 
regions to decision making, 42% interpret the SMH as supporting a role for markers in 
accuracy, 12% both speed and accuracy, and 46% are unspecified. None of the articles in our 
sample interpreted the SMH strictly as a thesis about speed.  
Few authors identified a specific stage at which somatic markers influence decision 
making, with 51% of the answers to question 5 coming out negative. Of those that did specify a 
role (n= 29), 7% of the articles favoured a deliberative role for somatic markers in the 
identification of consequences. Another 12% saw somatic markers playing an evaluative role 
in ranking or assessing options. Only 3% assigned a role for somatic markers in execution. 
Interestingly, 25% of the articles evidenced an ambiguous reference to core stages, vacillating 
between one or more sub-processes (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Alternate interpretations of SMH. 
Frequencies indicate the proportions of scientific 
articles that assigned to somatic markers a specific 
stage in decision making. Stages are defined in the 
text, see also Table 1.  	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To summarize, there appears to be no consensus in our sample about the meaning of the 
somatic marker hypothesis. Even on such fundamental questions as modality and processing 
role, there is a diversity of alternative interpretations. It is noteworthy that not a single article 
appealed to speed as the sole processing role for somatic markers; all authors who took 
somatic markers as contributing to speed assumed that they simultaneously enhance 
accuracy. This is surprising, given that these properties are likely to trade off against one 
another. On the more nuanced question about the specific stage of decision making at which 
markers have a role, more than half of the authors in our sample expressed no commitment. 
This suggests that most authors are not thinking about SMH in the context of a detailed 
computational account of decision-making. This reading is further supported by Question 1 
in our survey, in which 39% of the authors described SMH purely in the context of brain 
regions, not mentioning somatic markers at all. A sizable proportion of articles equivocated 
among alternative stages. Among those who did commit to a specific stage of decision making 
for somatic markers, opinions were split mainly between deliberation and evaluation. Only 
two authors interpret the SMH as suggesting a role in execution. This is also surprising, given 
that several authors have singled out execution as a particularly promising role for somatic 
markers (Dunn et al., 2006; Linquist & Bartol, 2013). 
As mentioned, our sample aimed to capture the primary disciplinary perspectives engaged 
in SMH research. It is possible that a greater number of articles, perhaps from a narrower 
range of journals, including journals from a more specific subset of disciplines, might reveal 
greater consensus. However, none of our observations suggest that this should be so. Our 
findings do not suggest that researchers are entirely unaware of ambiguity. Four of the articles 
in our survey demonstrated some awareness of the fact that results on the IGT are open to 
multiple interpretations; though zero articles demonstrated an awareness of ambiguity in 
SMH itself. 
This sample suggests that the ambiguity found in formulations of SMH has resulted in a 
spectrum of interpretations of the theory’s central claims. As we shall now argue, such 
widespread ambiguity can be explained by the lack of an adequate computational-level 
model of practical decision making.  
Three Levels of Description in SMH 
Levels of analysis in cognitive theory have been widely discussed (J. R. Anderson, 1990; 
Dennett, 1987; Marr, 1982; Newell, 1990; Pylyshyn, 1984; Stanovich, 1999; Sun et al., 2005). 
The array of different schemes for describing these levels can be ‘bewildering’, as one 
researcher has warned (Sterelny, 1990); and it is not our aim to review this literature here. 
What follows is a brief outline of the three-fold distinction between psychological, 
computational, and implementation levels. In each case we identify the corresponding 
descriptions in SMH at each level.  
i. Psychological level Descriptions of SMH  
Here we understand a psychological description to consist of three features. First, it 
describes some functional capacity exhibited by a whole system and not just some of its parts 
(Pylyshyn, 1984). Second, a psychological description identifies intentional states in the system 
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that it describes (Dennett, 1987; Stanovich, 1999). Finally, it assumes that the agent is rational 
(J. R. Anderson, 1990; Pylyshyn, 1984) in the sense that subjects are expected to use available 
information in ways that accord with their goals. 
Psychological descriptions of the somatic marker hypothesis identify a vague role for 
emotions in practical reasoning. These descriptions are typically framed against contrast cases 
in which decision making falters in brain damaged patients. Most notorious among these is 
Damasio’s focal patient, Elliot, who exhibited severe practical deficits after undergoing 
bilateral ablation to VMF (see Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991; Damasio, 1994; Eslinger & 
Damasio, 1985). Some of Elliot’s behavioural anecdotes suggest, at the psychological level, 
ways that emotion might influence decision making in less impaired subjects.   
Perhaps Elliott’s most widely cited deficit is chronic indecisiveness. For example:  
He needed about two hours to get ready for work in the morning, and some days were 
consumed entirely by shaving and hair-washing. Deciding where to dine might take 
hours, as he discussed each restaurant’s seating plan, particulars of each menu, 
atmosphere and management. He would drive to each restaurant to see how busy it was, 
but even then he could not finally decide which to choose. Purchasing small items 
required in-depth consideration of brands, prices, and the best method of purchase.  
(Eslinger & Damasio, 1985, p. 1732) 
Such anecdotes call attention to the relative economy of normal decision making. Elliot seems 
unable to limit the time and effort invested in decisions. He is unable to manage the number of 
options and the breadth of information considered. These deficiencies can perhaps be 
portrayed functionally as an inability to limit attention to the relevant facets of a prevailing 
situation (Damasio, 1994). But it is also possible that Elliott is simply unable to break out of the 
decision-making loop (Linquist and Bartol, 2013).  Indeed, other anecdotes suggest that Elliot 
had no problem making decisions per se. Where he faltered was in bringing himself to follow 
through with an execution.  Elliot self-reports that, even after successfully generating and 
evaluation lists of options: “I still would not know what to do” (Saver & Damasio, 1991, p. 
1246). It	  is	  conceivable	  that	  this	  lack of “oomph,” rather than some defect in the deliberation 
process itself, inspires Elliot to continually search for different features of a situation that 
might (eventually) propel him into action (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985).	  
A second type of deficit is also noteworthy. Consider the following:  
[Elliot’s] social conduct was profoundly affected by his brain injury. Over a brief period 
of time, he entered disastrous business ventures (one of which led to predictable 
bankruptcy), and was divorced twice (the second marriage, which was to a prostitute, 
only lasted 6 months). He has been unable to hold any paying job since the time of 
surgery, and his plans for future activity are defective. (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1990, p. 82) 
In these accounts Elliot appears able to execute decisions, but does so in foreseeably 
disastrous ways. Such descriptions of Elliot’s poor choices support the ‘myopia for the future’ 
interpretation, which suggest that normal decisions accord with an agent’s long-term goals.  
To summarize, psychological descriptions of Elliot’s cognitive deficits draw attention to a 
cluster of features characteristic of normal decision making. These include:  
Economy in the time and effort required to reach a decision. 
Relevance of considerations to appropriate contexts. 
Execution of decisions once they have been made. 
Foresight to take into account likely undesirable outcomes.	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Psychological-level descriptions of SMH assume that somatic markers are beneficially related 
to (at least some of) these core features.   
ii. Computational Models of SMH 
Most multi-level accounts of cognition identify a computational (also called algorithmic) 
level below the psychological level (cf. Marr, 1982; Sun & Franklin, 2006). A computational 
model describes a series of steps that execute some system-level capacity. Often, these models 
identify distinct structures (e.g. symbols or subprocesses) not mentioned at the psychological 
level. A particular system will admit of multiple computational descriptions that vary in the 
number and specificity of the steps or structures that they identify. The level of detail might 
range from simple box-and-arrow process maps to more complex computer-implemented 
cognitive architectures.   
The computational model behind SMH is, at base, a simple account of the association 
between somatic markers and representations and their subsequent re-activation. The model 
holds that a negative or positively valenced state – a somatic marker – becomes attached to a 
mental representation of a stimulus. This happens through experience. These valenced 
markers are subsequently re-activated along-side those representations. In virtue of their 
negative/positive valence somatic markers convey information about the stimulus, thereby 
influencing the agent’s behaviour. More specific versions of this base mechanism link working 
memory to valence (Damasio, 1994), proposing that strongly marked representations will be 
held in working memory as a way of focussing attention on salient stimuli.  
iii. Implementation Level Descriptions of SMH 
Implementation level models attempt to capture the neurophysiological components and 
processes underlying cognition. These vary in anatomical specificity, ranging from broadly 
characterized neurological regions to specific descriptions of cellular and sub-cellular 
processes. There is no simple or single answer to the question about the right amount of 
anatomical detail to include in an implementation-level model. It will often depend on a 
researcher’s goals.  
The neurophysiological description of SMH has been praised as among its strengths 
(Dunn et al., 2006). The sequences of anatomical events behind the formation and re-
activation of somatic markers has been specified in considerable detail, relying on both 
human and animal studies. The amygdala is thought to be a crucial ‘trigger’ structure in the 
initial formation of somatic markers (Bechara, 2003). Damasio and Bechara (2005) explain 
that the amygdala marries a stimulus to a somatic state. The stimulus is processed via the 
thalamus, while the somatic state is evoked via the hypothalamus and autonomic brainstem 
nuclei, which in turn produce changes in other visceral structures and the central nervous 
system (Bechara, 2004). Once linked, a pattern of activation is formed. After initial formation, 
the authors claim that this same pattern is reactivated upon subsequent encounters with the 
stimulus or its representation (eg. in memory or imagination). In cases of re-activation, the 
VMF, rather than the amygdala, acts as the trigger structure. It couples mental representations 
of a stimulus to the previously-established somatic state pattern (Bechara, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 2000). Because some somatic state activation seems to occur without detectable 
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changes to the central nervous system, SMH specifies a second process in which the somatic 
state re-activation bypasses the central nervous system, acting instead on brain regions 
normally involved in motor pathways and somatosensory responses. This system – dubbed 
the ‘as if’ body loop (Bechara, 2004) – produces a neural state change that mimics an absent 
bodily response. This is connected with work on self-awareness and the insula. A growing 
body of research suggests that the insula is involved in representing body states, which may be 
integrated into various cognitive and pre-cognitive processes, like choice and decision 
making (Craig, 2009). 
Additionally, Bechara and colleagues (2001) have probed the contributions of certain 
neurotransmitter systems to decision making behaviours. Following this work, SMH includes 
an account explaining how linking neurotransmitter control to somatic state re-activation 
could provide a mechanism for modulating synaptic activity, raising/lowering the action 
potentials of neuronal groups underlying behaviour and cognition (see Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005). 
Ambiguities in SMH Owe to a Disconnect  
Between Psychological and Computational Levels 
Having separated distinct levels of description in SMH, perhaps the most striking feature is 
the way in which the simple associative computational mechanism has been investigated and 
characterized at the implementation level. This exemplifies fruitful investigation across these 
two levels. Neuroanatomical research has revealed distinctions invisible at the computational 
level. For example, the fact that the VMF replaces the amygdala as the trigger structure after 
initial pattern formation reveals that initial activation and subsequent re-activation are in fact 
different types of process. This shows how implementation-level details help flesh out and 
expand computational-level mechanisms.   
The same relationship does not currently obtain between psychological and 
computational or neurological levels. At the psychological level one finds a general 
characterization of some core features of decision making that are absent in VMF patients. 
This tells us that somatic markers aid decision making, but not how they do so. This 
explanation cannot come from the implementation level, either, since it is unclear what 
processes to search for in the brain. Categories like ‘decision making’ and ‘economy’ and 
‘relevance’ are far too broad to explicate in neurological terms.  
Enter the computational level, which ought to serve as a bridge between psychological 
processes and neurological details. Computational descriptions can explicate mechanisms 
that may lay behind broad psychological processes. Those mechanisms can then be 
investigated at the implementation level. In order to bring psychological claims into the fold, 
the computational mechanism must be sufficiently detailed to unpack and expand the 
psychological description. However the basic association/re-activation model currently 
associated with SMH is unfit for this purpose. Though it specifies how and when somatic 
markers may be formed and activated, it does not address how this association and re-
activation participates in practical decision making. There is a disconnect between the 
psychological claims and the computational mechanism. This disconnect is the source of the 
ambiguity problem. 
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To illustrate, take the property of economy. Tests on Elliot and other brain lesion patients 
suggest a relationship between economy and somatic markers. Yet there are a number of 
plausible ways in which the association/reactivation mechanism could function to aid 
decisions in this way. Normal decision making might be economical because somatic markers 
streamline the range of options up for consideration, restricting focus only to those which are 
positively valenced. Alternatively, somatic markers might assign some kind of weighting 
function to the evaluation of candidate options, perhaps ranking them according to net 
valence. This interpretation is arguably at play in IGT (Colombetti, 2008; Dunn et al., 2006; 
Maia & McClelland, 2004; Tomb, Hauser, Deldin, & Caramazza, 2002). A third possibility is 
that somatic markers enhance economy by highlighting certain information about certain 
options, for example, drawing attention to consequences.  A fourth possibility is that somatic 
markers index the relevance or gravity of a potential outcome for the subject, and influence 
the amount of time or care dedicated to cost benefit analysis. Somatic markers are conceivably 
involved in any one of these processes.   
Similar possibilities arise when attempting to explain the relevance, foresight, and 
execution of normal decision making. These are very general properties of a multi-stage 
process. The basic association/reactivation mechanism leaves too many options for 
explaining how that mechanism might interact with decision making to produce these 
psychological properties. 
What is needed is a way to regiment and align computational and psychological accounts. 
To this end, we offer the following five-step model of decision making. For simplicity, we 
present these as ‘stages’, but they are best conceived as alternate mechanisms or subroutines 
within the decision making process – it seems likely that these stages would occur in parallel 
and with feedback loops. We offer this simple idealization as a first pass for developing a 
computational model that will help to generate a range of specific hypotheses about how a 
somatic marker mechanism might be employed in the service of practical decision making.  
This five-stage decision making model allows for regimentation of the various possible 
computational hypotheses, in the manner demonstrated above.  In laying out the possible 
functional roles for somatic markers this model should also point to the kinds of bodily state 
mapping that are necessary to fill certain roles. This is necessary in order to explain how 
somatic markers can fill the various functional roles ascribed to them. Recent research has 
identified other brain structures besides the VMF and amygdala as potentially instrumental to 
decision making. For instance, philosopher Phil Gerrans (2007) argues that the dopamine 
system both confers salience on certain stimuli and also motivates agents to pursue rewarding 
goals. Gerrans argues that this system of dopamine-based reward, rather than the assessment 
of valence, drives decision making on tasks like the IGT. This is an important challenge to 
SMH.  However, it inherits many of the same ambiguities.  What is the precise role that 
dopamine plays in the decision making process? The suggestion is that dopamine influences 
both salience and motivation. However there are several ways in which salience might aid 
decisions.  Perhaps salience aids in the quick generation or elimination of options. Perhaps it 
renders options more/less likely to be chosen upon evaluation. A more detailed model of 
decision making helps to tease apart these challenges to SMH as much as it helps to identify  
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candidate versions of the hypothesis. A similar point applies to the recent finding that the 
anterior cingulated cortex is involved in the assignment of hedonic tone to a stimulus (Craig, 
2009; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003; Sescousse, Redouté, & Dreher, 2010).  It might 
be argued that this brain structure, which presumably does not transmit valence, but assigns 
other qualitative features to a stimulus, is involved in the general process of decision making.  
Our five step model provides a framework for refining and testing this hypothesis.  
In the final section of this paper we outline some of the methodological implications of 
this model on experimental design. Before doing so, it is important to draw a connection 
between our computational model of decision making and existing computational models of 
SMH.  
Often the aim of computational modelling is to create a complex architecture, 
implemented on an electronic computer, that performs certain (often circumscribed) tasks in 
ways similar to humans (Sun et al., 2005). Existing computer models of SMH are problematic 
because they assign high-level psychological functions (e.g. myopia for the future) to specific 
brain regions. They are also problematic because they rely on the IGT as their sole decision 
making probe (Kalidindi, Bowman, & Wyble, 1994; Wagar & Thagard, 2004). The most 
notable of these models is Wagar and Thagard’s (2004) GAGE neural network (named after 
Phineas Gage the railroad engineer). GAGE uses collections of artificial neurons to represent 
distinct brain regions, such as the VMF, amygdala, and hippocampus. In order to assign roles 
to various brain structures, models like GAGE must rely on existing psychological and 
computational descriptions. In determining the profile for the VMF, for instance, GAGE’s 
creators relied on the contentious ‘myopia for the future’ interpretation of SMH. The VMF 
was accordingly assigned the role of encoding preference for future outcomes. Since this 
hypothesis is unclear and as-yet untested (Dunn et al., 2006), GAGE does not tell us what role 
Table 1. Multi-stage model of practical decision making.  For each stage, a 
psychological-level description is accompanied by an example computational-
level hypothesis, proposing a role for somatic markers at that stage. 
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somatic markers play. It tells us only that an impaired ability to anticipate future outcomes 
results in poor IGT performance. Setting aside the use of the IGT as a probe for SMH, these 
models still do not yet provide insight into somatic marking. We cannot assess whether GAGE 
reflects somatic marking in human cognition because we do not yet know how somatic 
markers influence particular stages of decision making. GAGE, and other cognitive 
architectures for decision making, provide hope for future modelling of SMH. But this level of 
modelling is possible only once specific computational models are hypothesized, tested, and 
confirmed.  
Implications for Experimental Design 
The general claim that emotions or somatic markers are associated with decision making 
appears to be well-established (Dunn et al., 2006). Future work ought to investigate how they 
are implicated. Earlier it was noted that IGT is currently the primary experimental probe for 
SMH. Our five stage model helps to reveal why it is unfit for this purpose. The IGT cannot test 
whether somatic markers are involved in decision-point recognition because decision points 
are artificially delineated by the experimental setup. It similarly cannot test the thesis that 
somatic markers assist in option generation because the options are pre-selected. The IGT 
cannot test the claim that somatic markers highlight relevant information about the options, as 
participants are required to consider only one type of information: expected profit. The IGT 
is also ill-equipped to test the thesis that somatic markers are involved in motivating execution 
of a decision because selections are explicitly motivated as part of the experimental setup. In 
sum: the IGT is not a test of specific computational models. The IGT is a test of the broad 
psychological claim that affect is implicated in practical decision making. At most the IGT can 
be used to determine whether specific neurological structures contribute (somehow) to 
decision making. But the IGT is a rather blunt instrument insofar as it skips the computational 
level altogether.   
Linquist & Bartol (2013) have argued that some early experiments developed by Saver and 
Damasio (1991), later abandoned in favour of the IGT, were in fact superior robes of specific 
stages in decision making. Here we elaborate these suggestions and propose some additional 
methods for investigating peripheral stages in practical decision making.  
The Optional Thinking Test measures participants’ ability to generate candidate solutions 
to hypothetical social dilemmas. This is a straightforward test of option generation. Saver and 
Damasio (1991) compared the performance of a VMF lesion patient on the Optional Thinking 
Test to controls. Although they found no significant difference, this study was performed on 
only a single subject (Elliott). To our knowledge this procedure has not been tested on a larger 
sample. A second strategy would deploy physiological measurements of autonomic arousal 
to determine whether they correlate with the rate or number of options generated in this task. 
Functional imaging might offer a third strategy for identifying the brain structures involved in 
option generation. Attention to the nature of this process might recommend focus on regions 
associated with salience, such as the PACC, or valence, such as the amygdala (Phillips et al., 
2003). 
In their Awareness of Consequences Test, Saver and Damasio (1991) presented 
participants with four hypothetical predicaments that offer a temptation to transgress certain 
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social norms. Participants were asked to explain which considerations they would take into 
account when deciding what to do. This task is an excellent probe for deliberation, that is, for 
the ability to generate foreseeable consequences from available options. Interestingly, Elliot 
performed significantly better than controls on this task, suggesting that an intact VMF is not 
necessary for this task. Again, a larger sample would provide more conclusive findings. 
Physiological recordings, correlated with performance measures in the rate or number of 
consequences identified, would further probe whether somatic markers facilitate either the 
speed or the accuracy of this stage in decision making. Anatomical focus might be directed at 
regions associated with salience, such as the PACC (Phillips et al., 2003). 
 A third task developed by Saver and Damasio (1991) is the Means/Ends Problem-Solving 
Test. This story completion task asks participants to generate a step-by-step plan for achieving 
some social objective; for example, the goal of making friends in a new neighbourhood. 
Scoring is based on the number of relevant versus irrelevant factors that participants generate. 
This task is particularly well suited for testing any computational model that predicts somatic 
markers participate in deliberation.  
The hypothesis that somatic markers influence evaluation predicts that markers will 
transmit valence onto alternative courses of action. A simple test might draw on Jonathan 
Haidt’s paradigm for testing the influence of emotion on moral reasoning (Schnall, Haidt, 
Clore, & Jordan, 2008). In this task, participants are presented with disgust-evoking stimuli 
while rating the severity of moral transgressions. He finds that a strong disgust response 
accentuates moral condemnation. In a decision making context participants might be 
presented with candidate solutions to some practical challenge, and asked to rate them for 
their practicality. If negative somatic markers transmit their valence onto associated 
representations, then practicality rankings should be lower in the disgust-inducing context 
than in controls. Similar experiments using a positive stimulus as the independent variable 
could likewise test whether positive valence is transmitted in the evaluation of candidate 
courses of action. Such experiments could further incorporate a physiological or neurological 
dimension. Given that the nature of evaluation recommends a role for hedonic tone, focus 
should be directed toward the ACC (Craig, 2009; Sescousse et al., 2010) 
Suggestions up to this point have focussed on experiments probing the core stages of 
decision making. It is more challenging to devise experiments that probe peripheral stages – 
decision-point recognition and execution. Our suggestions are therefore tentative.  
Decision point recognition is inherently a refocusing of one’s attention, often away from 
some engaging activity, onto the task of decision making. An adequate experimental probe 
might first engage participants’ attention, and then present emotionally evocative stimuli as 
the independent variable. Video games are well suited to this purpose. We are presumably all 
familiar with games that require players to find their way through a maze. Emotionally salient 
distractions could be built into the fabric of the game. The hypothesis that somatic markers 
facilitate decision-point recognition predicts that emotional stimuli will (a) disengage a 
subject from an otherwise engrossing activity and (b) redirect attention towards the 
identification of alternative options. As a dependent variable, the game could include a 
function that enables players to request practically relevant information on demand. One 
would expect such requests to be triggered by evocative stimuli. 
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The key is to isolate this final stage of the decision process from ones that precede it. Thus, 
participants would have to indicate when a decision to execute some action has been reached. 
One could then measure latency in execution following a decision. Of particular interest is the 
possibility that failure to execute a decision reinitiates the process, perhaps giving rise to the 
sort of chronic indecisiveness that sometimes plagues Elliot.  
Conclusion 
A promising explanation for the proliferation of somatic marker hypotheses is that, though 
researchers are attuned to the broad psychological claim that emotions play a role in practical 
decision making and to the interesting way in which the association/re-activation mechanism 
has been explained at the implementation level, they are generally not attuned to the 
relationship between the computation and the psychological levels. We hope our analysis has 
suggested a route forward. For research on decision making, our work suggests that a simple 
computational model will help highlight and regiment ambiguity within a more general 
psychological account. Some readers might be surprised at just how simple our 
computational model of decision making is, in fact. Presumably an even more detailed model 
could generate even more precise hypotheses. 
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